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Abstract—Side-Channel Analysis used for codebreaking could
be used constructively as a probing tool for internal gates
in integrated circuits. This paper outlines basic methods and
mathematics for that purpose
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent times Side-Channel Attacks [2] have attracted
a lot of attention from the information security community.
These techniques are very similar to Spectroscopy(NMR) used
over the years. While in spectroscopy, patterns in the light
spectrum are used to detect the presence of atoms and its
environments in an unknown substance, in a Side-Channel
Attack the cryptanalyst looks for patterns in the power con-
sumption or EM emission to detect the unknown key value.
Apart from cryptanalysis, side-channel could be of great utility
to an electrical engineer, as a probing tool more in line with
spectroscopy used in physics.
II. POWER CONSUMPTION MODEL
In this article we consider the Power Traces S(Ii, Ii−1, t) of
a combinatorial circuit. That is it has no memory. Ii and Ii−1
are the ith and (i− 1)th input to this block, and t is the time
sample of the measured current from power supply. Power is
only consumed when the input goes through a transition. The
power trace is recorded for a time duration [0,T] where the
transition is applied at t=0 and and T is any time after that
when there is no further change in measured current. In this
article we use a recursive model of power consumption. For
purpose of illustration, we consider a block with N subblocks
(see figure 1.
A sub-block with N inputs is characterized by it’s step
current response as the input vectors undergoes a transition
ij → ik. Note that output loads are considered to be part of
this sub-block.
Sij→ik(t) = Imeasured(t) (1)
and the sub-block is characterized by the set of all step
responses corresponding to each transition.⋃
0<ij<2
N−1
0<ik<2
N−1
Sij→ik(τ)
Now we view the DUT as recursively organized in various
sub-blocks. At the topmost level the DUT consists of N such
gates(see figure. 1) where kth gate has Nk possible input tran-
sitions at it’s input. That is, the length of the input transition
alphabet to the kth gate is denoted as Nk. Furthermore
• S(k, j, t) denotes the step current response s(τ) associ-
ated with jth transition of the kth gate.
• A(k, j, Ii, Ii−1) denotes the jth transition on the kth
block is activated, during the interval depending on Ii
and Ii−1
Next we normalize the traces to have a zero mean. So we
will assume that S(k, j, t) has a zero mean from now onwards.
We even redefine the activation function as:
T (k, j, Ii, Ii−1) = 1 if input vector to the kth gate
undergoes jth transition
T (k, j, Ii, Ii−1) =−1 if input vector to the kth gate
remains unchanged
T (k, j, Ii, Ii−1) = 0 if j > Nk
Note that A(k, , j, Ii, Ii−1) can be written in terms of
T (k, , j, Ii, Ii−1) as
A(k, j, Ii, Ii−1) =
1
2
× (1 + T (k, j, Ii, Ii−1)) (2)
The advantage of this representation is that we can write,
for M random input transitions
M−1∑
i=0
T (k1, j1, Ii, Ii−1)×T (k2, j2, Ii, Ii−1) = 0 ifk1 6= k2&j1 6= j2
M−1∑
i=0
T (k1, j1, Ii, Ii−1)×T (k2, j2, Ii, Ii−1) =M ifk1 = k2&j1 = j2
This is based on the assumption that all transitions are inde-
pendent, and it closely follows the mathematical definition of
orthogonality over M random input transitions.
With this notation we can write one power trace for input
vector transition from Ii to Ii−1 as
S(t) =
N−1∑
k=0
Nk−1∑
j=0
A(k, j, Ii, Ii−1)× S(k, j, n) (3)
S(t) =
N−1∑
k=0
Nk−1∑
j=0
1
2
× T (k, j, Ii, Ii−1)× S(k, j, t) (4)
III. POST-PROCESSING
Now we want to find out the step current response associ-
ated with pth transition of the qth gate. For that purpose we
apply M random transitions < Ii, Ii−1 > at the input which
also includes transitions that will trigger the event A(p, q, t)
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Fig. 1. Power Consumption Model.
and multiply each trace by T (p, q, Ii, Ii−1)
sacc(t) =
M−1∑
i=0
T (p, q, Ii, Ii−1)× S(t)
sacc(t) =
M−1∑
i=0
T (p, q, Ii, Ii−1)×
N−1∑
k=0
Nk−1∑
j=0
1
2
×
(1 + T (k, j, Ii, Ii−1))× S(k, j, t)
sacc(t) =
M−1∑
i=0
T (p, q, Ii, Ii−1)×
N−1∑
k=0
Nk−1∑
j=0
1
2
× S(k, j, t) +
M−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
k=0
Nk−1∑
j=0
(T (k, j, Ii, Ii−1))× T (p, q, Ii, Ii−1)× S(k, j, t)
sacc(t) =
M−1∑
i=0
T (p, q, Ii, Ii−1)×N ×Nk × 1
2
Ej,k[S(k, j, t)] +
N−1∑
k=0
Nk−1∑
j=0
S(k, j, t)× 1
2
×
M−1∑
i=0
(T (k, j, Ii, Ii−1))× T (p, q, Ii, Ii−1)
sacc(t) =
M−1∑
i=0
T (p, q, Ii, Ii−1)×N ×Nk × 1
2
E(S(t)) +
M
2
S(p, q, t)
Since we preprocessed the tracesS(t) to have a zero mean
, we can find out the step current response as
sacc(t) =
M
2
S(p, q, t) (5)
IV. RECURSIVE REFINEMENT
In the above section we outlined a method to find the current
response associated with the pth transition of the qth gate.
This process can continued recursively for the qth gate until
we have only a single net, in which case we can derive the
voltage waveform from the step current response using basic
circuit behaviour.
In the above mentioned method, the orthogonality of
T (k, j, Ii, Ii−1) functions play a pivotal role. Even in Template
Side-Channel Attacks [1] A major step is to find orthogonal
representation of the acquired traces. To guarantee this orthog-
onality we can divide a block recursively into two sub-blocks
using minimum cut bisection, and finally arriving at the target
transition.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article we illustrated a very preliminary outline
of how power analysis techniques can be used for probing
each single net behaviour in the circuit, thus acting as an
oscilloscope even for physically inaccessible components. This
will beneficial for modelling new technologies based on in-
circuit measurement. The difference between Side-Channel
Attacks(SCA) and Side-Channel Oscilloscope(SCO) is that
in SCA, the user does not have the full knowledge of the
circuit. So the functions T (k, j, Ii, Ii−1) are only guesses. In
SCO, the user can calculate the activation functions, but for
him the unknown is the response of the fabricated circuit.The
major assumptions that we made are that the transitions are
orthogonal/independent, which may not be true for all circuits,
however for some amount of interdependence we still get a
magnification for the target transition, and dependent transition
current response remains present as noise. This process can
be further improved by imposing DFT rules, and using more
complicated post processing techniques such as Principal
Component Analysis as used in Template Attacks [1].
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